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The preceding chapters have focused exclusively on positive questions 
related to the effect of federal taxes on charitable giving. The objective of 
this final chapter is to conclude the analysis by, first, summarizing the ma- 
jor findings and, second, providing a broader framework for the evalua- 
tion of  tax policy toward charitable giving. The first section presents a 
brief summary of findings from empirical studies of tax effects on charita- 
ble giving, notes some of the important implications for tax policy, and 
lists several important  unanswered  questions.  The second  section dis- 
cusses the normative evaluation of tax policy toward charitable giving, 
noting in particular the relevance of empirical work on charitable behav- 
ior. 
8.1  Tax Effects on Charitable Giving: An Overview 
From the evidence presented in the preceding chapters, it is possible to 
draw conclusions regarding the effect of tax policy on charitable behavior 
and to highlight some of the most important implications of this empirical 
work. It is useful to begin with a brief summary of the findings from econ- 
ometric studies. 
8.1.1  Summary of the Findings 
Econometric analysis has focused on four major areas of charitable be- 
havior:  individual  contributions,  volunteering,  corporate  giving,  and 
charitable bequests. There is also some empirical evidence on the effect of 
taxes on foundations, but no econometric studies have been done in that 
area. The bulk of econometric analysis and attention in economic studies 
has been directed toward individual giving, which seems appropriate giv- 
en the large share of  total gifts accounted for by individuals. Contribu- 
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tions by individuals vary widely by income level and age as well as among 
individuals within those classifications. The major tax policy instrument 
affecting individual giving is the charitable deduction allowed in the cal- 
culation of taxable income for taxpayers who itemize their deductions. As 
a result of this tax treatment, there are two major tax effects on individual 
giving: the tax liability affects the after-tax income from which taxpayers 
can make contributions and the deduction reduces the net price per dollar 
of contribution made. The econometric analysis of individual giving im- 
plies that the income tax has a strong effect on giving. This is not to say, 
however, that taxes are the only or the major influence on individual con- 
tributions, only that they are one significant factor. 
Taken as a whole, the empirical work on tax effects and individual giv- 
ing is notable for the number and variety of studies in the area and the 
consistency of the findings. In few other applied areas in public finance 
has there been such extensive replication of  empirical findings using dif- 
ferent data sets. Studies of charitable contributions have used aggregated 
and individual data, data from tax returns and survey data, and foreign as 
well as U.S. experience. The consensus of these studies is that the price 
elasticity for the population of taxpayers is probably greater than 1 in ab- 
solute value, although there are certainly estimates that are smaller and es- 
timates that are considerably larger than this. The range of most likely val- 
ues  appears  to be  about  -  0.9  to -  1.4.  Taxes  also  influence  giving 
through an income effect, with most estimates of the income elasticity 
falling between 0.6 and 0.9. 
In order to appreciate the implications of these findings, it is necessary 
to consider the specific hypotheses, different uses of data, and qualifica- 
tions that apply to the studies themselves. For example, one maintained 
hypothesis is that itemization status and marginal tax rate work together 
through  the price effect to affect giving, and that there is no separate 
“itemization effect.” Separate tests of such an effect, in fact, confirm this 
maintained hypothesis. Another important question is whether the price 
elasticity varies by income level. The extensive analysis on this question 
has failed to provide a definitive answer, but it appears that the elasticity 
rises in absolute value with income. It is reasonable to conclude, however, 
that the price elasticity is significantly less than zero even for low-income 
taxpayers. A question of particular importance for evaluating the impact 
of tax policy is whether taxpayers respond immediately to changes in price 
and income. Evidence on this question suggests that there are substantial 
lags in giving behavior, with the result that short-run responses are much 
less complete than those in the long run. One other question related to the 
impact of fiscal policy on contributions is whether increased government 
spending “crowds out” private giving. The econometric evidence on this 
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tionship  observed  among  nations  in  the  size of  government and  the 
strength of  private giving. Throughout this empirical literature certain 
econometric issues have had to be dealt with, in particular the high corre- 
lation between price and income. Based on attempts to correct for possi- 
ble biases as well as the variety of data and models used in these studies, it 
appears that these econometric problems are not a major factor in ex- 
plaining the pattern of estimates. 
Along with individual contributions, volunteering is one of the two ma- 
jor sources of private support for the charitable sector. In contrast to indi- 
vidual giving, however, our knowledge about the tax effects on volunteer- 
ing is quite limited. For one thing, data on volunteering are sparse, and 
data linking volunteering to tax variables are even more limited. In theory, 
income taxation can have two broad effects on volunteering: a direct ef- 
fect through the influence of tax rates on the allocation of time, and an in- 
direct effect, through the charitable deduction for donations. The former 
effect depends on whether volunteering is simply a competing use of time, 
such as leisure, work, and household production, or whether it is a form 
of  investment in human capital. The latter depends on whether gifts of 
money and gifts of time are complements or substitutes. The evidence on 
these questions is both limited and mixed. An analysis of volunteering by 
women suggests that contributions and volunteering are complements, 
implying that the charitable deduction encourages volunteering as well as 
donations. Also, volunteering tends to be crowded out by market work. 
To the extent that work and volunteering are rival uses of time, tax poli- 
cies that encourage labor force participation among women tend to re- 
duce their volunteering. 
There is a much larger econometric literature on the effect of  taxes on 
corporate giving. The new evidence presented in this study is broadly con- 
sistent with earlier findings and suggests that the corporation tax has both 
a price and a net-income effect on corporate giving. Such behavior by 
firms would be consistent with a number of models other than pure profit 
maximization. The estimates of the income-effect elasticity using the cash 
flow measure of  income are close to 1, suggesting that contributions are 
proportional to after-tax income. An important question remains, howev- 
er, regarding the proper specification of this income measure. qualitative- 
ly similar results are obtained using after-tax net income. The estimated 
price elasticities appear to be smaller than those estimated for individual 
contributions, but the estimates presented here leave some doubt due to 
the difference in results using marginal and average tax rates, respectively. 
Taken together, these results suggest that the price elasticity is less than 1 
in absolute value. Finally, there is evidence that corporations time their 
gifts in order to take more deductions during years in which tax rates are 
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Tax effects are also apparent in bequest giving and foundation activity. 
The econometric evidence of bequest giving presented in this study, like 
previous work, produces estimates subject to substantial variation. Nev- 
ertheless, these estimates imply that the deduction in the estate tax has 
quite a strong effect by and large. Most estimates of the price elasticity are 
greater than 1  in absolute value. Bequests also rise with estate size, but the 
elasticity of estate size is  substantially smaller than 1. On estimates ob- 
tained for the very important group of the wealthiest decedents, those 
with net estates over $1 million, the estimated price elasticity was greater 
than 2 in absolute value, and the income elasticity exceeded 1. In any as- 
sessment of  the aggregate effect of estate tax changes on charitable be- 
quests, the largest estates are of paramount importance because they ac- 
count for most bequest giving. No comparable econometric evidence on 
foundation activity has as yet been produced.  The limited information 
that is available suggests, though, that the provisions in the Tax Reform 
Act of 1969 related to private foundations had the effect of raising payout 
rates without threatening the existence of foundations. 
8.1.2  Implications for Tax Policy and the Nonprofit Sector 
The major conclusion arising from this empirical work is that federal 
taxes, especially tax provisions affecting charitable giving, have impor- 
tant effects on the size and distribution of giving. The deductions in the in- 
dividual, corporate, and estate taxes are of course most important, in the 
sense that no other tax changes with comparable revenue effects would in- 
fluence charitable giving as much as the elimination of  these deductions. 
But other, ,more general tax provisions and changes also have profound 
effects on giving. Probably the most important of these effects arise from 
the combination of the standard deduction, nominal tax schedules, and 
inflation. The effect of  inflation has been to erode the value of  the stan- 
dard deduction, causing an increase in the proportion of taxpayers who 
itemize their deductions. This in turn affects the price of giving. Another 
important set of tax changes not directly related to charitable giving has 
been revisions in the rate schedule itself. In particular, the decline in top 
marginal tax rates from 91 to 50 percent over the last three decades has 
had a sizable effect on the prices faced by taxpayers in the highest income 
classes. A tax change such as the 1981 tax act combines several changes 
likely to affect charitable giving. Simulations based on estimated models 
of individual giving suggest that the combined effect will be a slight in- 
crease in the rate of  giving, resulting from a large increase in giving by 
nonitemizers due to the “above-the-line” deduction and a slight decline in 
giving among upper-income taxpayers due to the drop in tax rates. 
Similarly, the econometric evidence presented here implies that federal 
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bor force participation of women-for  example, the deduction for secon- 
dary earners-may  tend to discourage volunteering. The extension of the 
charitable deduction to nonitemizers, on the other hand, may encourage 
volunteering if  gifts of time and money are complementary. The recent 
changes in the corporate tax resulting in an increase in the number of 
firms with no tax liability will tend to discourage corporate giving by rais- 
ing its average net price. The implications of the empirical analysis of be- 
quests are similar to those applying to individual contributions. The 1981 
tax act, which reduces the number of taxable estates and lowers the mar- 
ginal tax rate for many estates, is likely to discourage bequest giving by 
raising the net price of charitable bequests. 
As the simulations of individual giving show, one of the most important 
implications of existing empirical work is that tax policy can affect the dis- 
tribution as well as the level of contributions. Since donors at various in- 
come levels differ markedly in their propensities to make gifts to various 
kinds of  charitable organizations, tax changes that affect the distribution 
of giving among income classes will tend to affect the distribution of sup- 
port to various parts of the philanthropic sector. For example, the 1981 
tax act had the effect of significantly reducing marginal tax rates for tax- 
payers in the top brackets in both the income and estate taxes. If the effect 
of such price changes outweighs the influence of changes in net income or 
net estate, which they in fact appear to do, these tax changes are likely to 
cut the relative share of giving undertaken by the wealthy. This would im- 
ply a decline in support for institutions such as colleges, universities, cul- 
tural institutions, and private foundations and toward religious organiza- 
tions and certain health and welfare groups. It is important to emphasize, 
however, that implications such as these are based on price and income ef- 
fects and do not account for any possible changes in behavior by donors 
or charitable organizations. 
The econometric estimates also have implications for proposed or hy- 
pothetical tax provisions. Simulations in the text examine several propos- 
als that involve changes in the charitable deduction or general tax rate re- 
vision. Probably the largest effect would  be observed if  the charitable 
deduction were eliminated altogether, perhaps as part of some compre- 
hensive income tax. Such a change would have important effects on the 
distribution as well as the level of contributions, with gifts by wealthy tax- 
payers falling the most. Substituting a tax credit for the present deduc- 
tion, depending on the rate used, would have the effect primarily of redis- 
tributing  the  pattern  of  gifts  between  low  and  high  income groups. 
Smaller changes would come about as a result of less sweeping revisions, 
such as the constructive realization of  appreciated assets given as gifts or 
the expansion of the deduction at low and middle income levels. Each of 
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portant in simulating their effects to adjust for this. Similar effects could 
be calculated for bequest giving, with the elimination of the deduction in 
the estate tax having much the same kind of effect. 
8.1.3  Unanswered Questions 
Even though it encompasses many different studies, the econometric 
literature linking taxes to charitable giving still leaves a number of impor- 
tant questions unresolved. Some of these could in principle be answered 
within models such as those that have been estimated. In order to answer 
others, it would be necessary to employ more general models. Within the 
context of the models that have been estimated, questions remain in every 
major area of charitable giving. We  still do not have a precise idea, for ex- 
ample, of  the magnitude of the price elasticity for low-income house- 
holds. This is an important policy question because of the introduction of 
the new deduction for nonitemizers and because of the distributional im- 
plications of general tax changes. A second unanswered question is how 
the response to taxes varies according to the type of donee organization 
being supported. Although it might be difficult to estimate separate price 
and income elasticities by detailed donee class, it might well be possible to 
determine whether religious giving is affected differently from other types 
of contributions. The estimation of  tax effects on volunteering requires 
data on individuals’ volunteering, wage rates, labor force participation, 
and taxes. Given the available studies, it is simply impossible to determine 
beyond any doubt whether the present deduction encourages or discour- 
ages volunteering. Although there is a fair amount of consistency among 
studies of corporate giving, there remains considerable uncertainty as to 
the precise price elasticity and the appropriate measure of corporate in- 
come. Within the context of the models estimated, however, there is one 
additional question on which more information is required. If the deduc- 
tion for charitable contributions were limited or eliminated, corporations 
would have the incentive to substitute other deductible expenditures for 
corporate gifts. Because of this substitutability, the price elasticities based 
on the current regime of full deductibility would not be applicable. Con- 
cerning charitable bequests, the instability of elasticity estimates in several 
studies suggests that our knowledge about the tax effects is not as good as 
we would like. 
Other questions left unanswered by existing empirical work would re- 
quire broader models than have been used in previous work. The models 
underlying virtually all empirical work on charitable contributions are 
partial equilibrium  in nature.  They ignore interactions  among various 
kinds of giving as well as interactions between donors and donee organi- 
zations. It seems reasonable to suppose that changes in the tax treatment 
of contributions in one tax could affect contributions made subject to an- 
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might will increase lifetime giving. Except as between volunteering and 
lifetime gifts, there is no evidence on interactions of this kind. More gen- 
erally, most of the empirical analysis of charitable giving subject to a given 
tax assumes that the tax base itself is given. A more general analysis would 
recognize the possibility of endogenous changes in the tax base. The mod- 
els employed are also inadequate in their  failure to reflect interactions 
among donors and interactions between contributors and charitable orga- 
nizations. Contributions by peers may increase or decrease an individual’s 
contributions, and this relationship has important consequences for tax 
policy effects. Charitable organizations, for their part, may respond to 
changes in tax policy by varying their solicitation efforts. As long as ef- 
fects such as these are not reflected in econometric models, projected ef- 
fects based on those models must be seen as conditional statements only. 
8.2  Normative Criteria for Evaluating Tax Policy toward 
Charitable Giving 
The fundamental normative questions in the evaluation of tax policy 
toward  charitable  giving are whether  and to what  extent  such giving 
should be subsidized. If  charitable giving were just another category of 
personal spending by consumers, there might be no reason to consider any 
form of  subsidy whatsoever. A secondary question has to do with the 
proper form the subsidy should take, given that some subsidy is appropri- 
ate. In addressing questions such as these, it is useful to begin with the 
standard public finance criteria of  efficiency and  distributional  equity. 
Other, more sgecific considerations may also be important. Before dis- 
cussing these criteria, it is useful to note a fundamental distinction rel- 
evant to one specific form of subsidy-the  deduction. 
8.2.1 
Two quite different kinds of arguments have been offered to justify the 
present deductions for personal contributions and bequests. According to 
the first, the deductions are necessary adjustments in calculating the prop- 
er tax base. Andrews (1972) argues that contributions are properly ex- 
cluded from the income tax base because they constitute neither accumu- 
lation  nor  consumption,  the  two  components  of  income  under  the 
accretion concept.  I  Although contributions emanate from personal ex- 
penditures, he argues, they are not consumption in the usual sense because 
they effect a transfer of resources to others. Similarly, Wagner (1977) ar- 
gues that a deduction is the correct mechanism for calculating the proper 
base for estate taxation, on the basis that funds set aside for charitable 
Two Views of the Charitable Deduction 
1. See also Musgrave and Musgrave (1980, pp. 343-47)  for a definition of  the accretion 
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purposes are funds that cannot be enjoyed by the heirs of  an estate. By 
this reasoning, horizontal equity thus requires that contributions be de- 
ducted in calculating the tax base.2 
An alternative justification  for the current charitable deduction is to 
view the deduction as an incentive by which the tax law encourages desir- 
able behavior. According to this view charitable giving is an item of discre- 
tionary spending that warrants an incentive. A deduction is only one of 
several forms such an incentive might take; a tax credit or some matching 
arrangements might be as good or better. Since contributions are seen as 
discretionary expenditures by this view,3 there is no necessity to provide 
the incentive in the form of a deduction from income. In contrast, the first 
view plainly requires the use of a deduction. 
The implications of these views for the normative analysis of the tax 
treatment of charitable giving should be clear. If the deduction is seen as 
an absolutely necessary adjustment to income, it becomes “a matter of 
principle” (Break 1977, p.  1530),  and there remains little to discuss con- 
cerning the proper tax treatment of charitable giving. If it is an incentive, 
however, alternative subsidies are fair game for consideration.  The tax 
policy debate over the last two decades suggests that the first view is by no 
means universally accepted. That debate has focused on the form as well 
as scope of incentives for charitable giving. And, due to the existence of 
the standard deduction, the charitable deduction iself (along with the oth- 
er itemized deductions) has been effectively limited to a minority of tax- 
payers. Accordingly, the remainder of this chapter is predicated on the as- 
sumption that the form of tax subsidy is  not determined a priori, but 
rather is a question subject to normative policy analysis. 
8.2.2  Efficient Tax Incentives for Contributions 
The concept of economic efficiency is important in any full assessment 
of tax provisions related to charitable contributions.  Indeed, efficiency 
criteria  are necessary for answering the  primary  question  of  whether 
charitable gifts should be subsidized at all. In order to give more concrete- 
ness to the application of economic efficiency to charitable contributions, 
it is useful to begin by presenting a stylized illustration of a tax policy deci- 
sion involving incentives for charitable giving. Consider the choice be- 
2. See also Posnett 1979 for a description of this view. 
Similar reasoning underlay the justification for the deduction given in a 1938 Congres- 
sional Report: “The exemption from taxation on money or property devoted to charitable 
and other purposes is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated for the loss 
of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by ap- 
propriations from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the gen- 
eral welfare” (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 1938, p. 19). The statement makes 
no explicit reference to the proper income tax base. 
3. Wagner (1977, p. 2342) notes, disapprovingly, that the “conceptualization of charity as 
an act of personal consumption is conformable to the proclivities of many economists.” 281  Behavior and Evaluation of Tax Policy 
tween an increase of  $1 million in government expenditures and an in- 
crease of the same amount in tax subsidies for charitable giving, both 
being financed by an increase in tax rates. Further suppose the new incen- 
tive leads to an increase in charitable giving of $Xmillion. Obviously, gov- 
ernment expenditures under the first option will be higher by $1 million. 
By the same token, charitable giving will be higher under the second; it 
will  be $X million higher if  increased government expenditures do not 
crowd out private charity. Assuming no crowding out, the income avail- 
able to households after taxes and charitable giving will be $(X-1) million 
less in the second case. 
One definition of  efficiency used  in  connection  with  tax  policy  for 
charitable giving focuses on the size of the incentive effect. As stressed in a 
number of empirical studies of tax effects on charitable giving, if the price 
elasticity of charitable giving is greater than 1 in absolute value, a tax in- 
centive producing a marginal change in the rate of subsidy to contribu- 
tions will increase giving by more than the associated revenue loss. Ac- 
cordingly, some writers have defined the “efficiency” of the charitable 
deduction in terms of the ratio of increased contributions to foregone rev- 
en~e.~  By such a definition, the incentive described in the present example 
would be “efficient” if the elasticity is greater than 1 in absolute value be- 
cause the rise in contributions ($X  million) would exceed the revenue cost 
($1 million). Clearly this is quite a specialized definition of efficiency. This 
concept takes no account of the comparative social benefit derived from 
private contributions compared to public expenditures. Nor does it give 
any weight to the change in income after taxes and contributions. 
In order to,consider the implications of a more complete definition of 
efficiency, two kinds of theoretical models of incentives for contributions 
are discussed below. The first focuses on the presumed external benefits 
that result from contributions. The second includes more general optimal 
tax models that rest on an explicit maximization of welfare. 
External Benefits 
It appears to be widely agreed that in contrast to most other types of ex- 
penditures, charitable contributions often contain a substantial element 
of external benefit. While donors may reap some direct benefit from their 
contributions,  much of  that giving materially benefits others. It might 
also be argued that charitable organizations produce an external benefit 
for society to the extent that they offer alternatives to government ser- 
vices. One longstanding justification for public encouragement of chari- 
table giving appeals to the value of diversity in a pluralistic society.s It is a 
4. Feldstein testified: “a higher elasticity implies a greater efficiency; that is, more addi- 
tional giving per dollar of lost tax revenues” (U.S. Congress, Senate 1980, p. 219). Also see 
Boskin (1976, p. 55) and Donee Group (1977, p. 73) for similar references. 
5. See chapter 7 for a discussion of this point in relation to foundations. 282  Behavior and Evaluation of Tax Policy 
basic theorem in applied welfare economics that goods producing external 
benefits tend to be underprovided in private markets and that economic 
efficiency can be served by  subsidizing such goods.  In equilibrium the 
price faced by each individual should ideally equal his personal marginal 
valuation of the good, with the subsidy making up the difference between 
marginal cost and marginal valuation.  Where the “good” is dollars of 
charitable contributions, (with a marginal cost of  $l), v is marginal valu- 
ation per dollar, and s is the subsidy per dollar, the relevant private opti- 
mality condition for individual i is simply: 
(1)  v,  + SI  = 1. 
Assuming the individual in equilibrium equates his marginal valuation 
with the price he faces (1 -  sl),  the social optimum will be achieved when sI 
is set at the marginal external benefit. The greater the external benefit, the 
larger the optimal subsidy.6 
Hochman and Rodgers (1977) and Posnett (1979) analyze the tax treat- 
ment of charitable contributions using similar normative models in which 
contributions are assumed to be pure public goods. Hochman and Rod- 
gers show that a set of tax subsidies based on a Lindahl solution achieves 
the optimal allocation.’ They argue further that, for a wide class of cases, 
a constant subsidy rate such as a tax credit satisfies the optimality condi- 
tion.  Posnett demonstrates, however, that the general superiority of  a 
constant rate of subsidy cannot be shown. About the most that can be 
gleaned from these theoretical studies is that tax subsidies of some kind 
for contributions can be justified on efficiency grounds. 
Practically speaking, it is quite inconceivable that any subsidy scheme 
could be devised to meet the conditions of a Lindahl solution. Both the 
characteristics of gifts and the tastes of  individuals differ too much. A 
more modest objective would be to set subsidy rates according to the aver- 
age amount of  external  benefit  from contributions of  different  kinds. 
Hochman and Rodgers (1977, pp. 13-15) recommend tax credits for con- 
tributions as a way of approximating the Lindahl solution and imply that 
subsidy rates might well differ by category of giving. They argue that reli- 
gious giving may have a more important external component than gifts to 
organizations that have some government counterpart (p. 13). On the oth- 
er hand, Schaefer (1968, p. 30) maintains that nonreligious giving involves 
much more redistribution than religious giving, the latter being used large- 
ly “to preserve houses of worship and to maintain the activities of congre- 
gations.” Discrimination among donees on the basis of external benefits 
6. For a general treatment, see Musgrave and Musgrave 1980, pp. 78-80. 
7. A Lindahl solution to the public-good allocation problem is one in which each individ- 
ual pays a price equal to his marginal evaluation and the sum of marginal valuations equals 
the marginal cost of the good. See Hochman and Rodgers 1977, p. 4. 283  Behavior and Evaluation of Tax Policy 
would be difficult, both analytically and politically, but there are prece- 
dents. Contributions to private foundations are accorded less favorable 
treatment in the lower percentage limitation of gifts, lack of carryover, 
and limitations on the deductibility of gifts of appreciated assets. And 
contributions to schools practicing racial discrimination are not deduct- 
ible at all.* 
Although the present deduction does not provide for any discrimina- 
tion in subsidy rates by type of charitable donee (except for the nondeduc- 
tibility of some gifts), subsidy rates definitely do differ by income level. 
As illustrated for 1980 in table 2.7 the rate of subsidy tends to rise with in- 
come because the marginal tax rate rises with income. For example, the 
average taxpayer in the $10,000-15,000 class in 1980 faced a marginal tax 
rate of 0.16, compared to a rate of  0.49 for a taxpayer in the $50,000- 
100,000 class. Distributional issues aside, this variation in subsidy rates 
may be judged in the light of the welfare economics of  subsidizing goods 
with external benefits. If the charitable activities supported by  high-in- 
come taxpayers-such  as higher education, cultural institutions, and pri- 
vate foundations-have  a higher component of external benefits than ac- 
tivities supported by  lower-income households  primarily religion and 
community-welfare agencies-this  structure of subsidies may be justified. 
However, if these activities cannot be distinguished on the basis of their 
external benefits in this way, differing rates of subsidy would not be effi- 
~ient.~  In any case, it is important to identify the structure of subsidy rates 
as primarily a question of efficiency, although distributional equity is rel- 
evant to the resulting pattern of tax burdens and the distribution of the 
benefits of charitable activities. 
Optimal Tax Models 
A more general treatment of the efficiency of tax incentives for charita- 
ble giving can be obtained with an optimal taxation model, as developed 
by Atkinson (1976) and Feldstein (1980). Atkinson’s model incorporates 
an additive social-welfare function in which individual utilities depend on 
their contributions. The well-being of a needy group in society can be af- 
fected either by contributions or government expenditures. The effective- 
ness of private giving in aiding this group can be more or less than that of 
government. Atkinson (p. 21) shows that the optimal tax-credit rate for 
contributions is  higher, among other things, the more effective private 
giving is. 
8. Private schools in North and South Carolina whose practices were found to bediscrimi- 
natory  were denied the rigkt  to receive deductible contributions in  1982. See New  York 
Times,  16October 1982, pp. 1, 7. 
9. See Culyer, Wiseman, and Posnett (1976, pp. 44-46)  for a proposal to replace the Brit- 
ish deduction by a matching grant with rates determined according to the externality crite- 
rion. Posnett 1979 also endorses such a policy in general terms. 284  Behavior and Evaluation of Tax Policy 
Atkinson also spells out the special assumptions under which the nar- 
row “efficiency” concept noted above is an appropriate rule for determin- 
ing whether the introduction of  a charitable deduction improves social 
welfare. Two conditions are necessary: contribution dollars must be as ef- 
fective as public expenditures in helping the needy group, and the social- 
welfare function must be Rawlsian, with all weight being given to the util- 
ity of recipients. In terms of the example given above, the first assumption 
allows dollars of giving to be compared directly to dollars of government 
revenue; the second makes it unnecessary to be concerned with donors’ in- 
comes after taxes and contributions. The deduction is a social improve- 
ment if the rise in contributions exceeds the revenue cost (if X  > l),  that 
is, if the elasticity is greater than one in absolute value. In general, howev- 
er, the desirability of a deduction depends not only on the effectiveness of 
contributions, but also on the weight given to the preferences of donors 
and the equity effects of a deduction compared to a credit.Io An elasticity 
of -  1 has no general efficiency connotations. 
Feldstein’s (1980) model compares the cost, measured by a representa- 
tive individual’s willingness to pay, of increasing the consumption of some 
preferred  good through government expenditure versus private giving. 
The effectiveness of the two types of expenditure is allowed to differ. His 
model, like Atkinson’s, implies that a subsidy for charitable contributions 
is desirable under certain conditions, particularly when the government is 
less efficient in provision, when labor supply is more sensitive to the mar- 
ginal tax rate, and when there is no preexisting subsidy. Feldstein points 
out that these findings conflict with the view that all “tax expenditures” 
should be eliminated. Significantly, Feldstein’s model implies that the op- 
timal subsidy does not depend on the price elasticity of giving. 
Other Eficiency-Related Considerations 
More generally, issues related to administrability or neutrality are prop- 
er considerations in the design of tax incentives for contributions. Admin- 
istrability covers such issues as the compliance and administrative costs of 
tax provisions. As an illustration, proposals that would specify differing 
rates of subsidy for different types of charitable organizations might well 
entail higher enforcement costs. Alternatively, the extension of  a tax sub- 
sidy for charitable gifts to low-income households might require signifi- 
cant increases in record keeping by taxpayers. 
Neutrality arises as an issue particularly in the treatment of different 
types of charitable gifts. Long (1977) notes, for example, that the charita- 
ble deduction in the income tax provides neutral treatment as between 
gifts of time and money since the value of either kind of gift is excluded in 
the calculation of taxable income.  l Thus any important change in the tax 
10. See especially Atkinson 1976, p. 25. 
11. Boskin (1976, p. 50) makes a similar point. 285  Behavior and Evaluation of Tax Policy 
incentive for contributions  in  any major  tax could  distort taxpayers’ 
choices among lifetime gifts, volunteering, bequests, and even gifts made 
through a corporation. Another way of putting this point is that such tax 
incentives may affect the various tax bases. The elimination of the charita- 
ble deduction in the estate tax might well increase the amount of wealth 
given away during life, thus reducing the size of estates.” 
8.2.3  Distributional Aspects of  Tax Incentives 
The charitable deduction has come in for sustained and vigorous criti- 
cism for its alleged favoritism toward high-income taxpayers. Because the 
tax savings per dollar obtained from the deduction rises with one’s mar- 
ginal tax rate, high-income taxpayers enjoy a bigger proportional tax re- 
duction in their giving than taxpayers at lower income levels. One critic 
(Nielson 1979, p. 16) states: 
the so-called “tax incentives” for charitable giving which are now em- 
bodied in the Internal Revenue Code are so extravagantly discrimina- 
tory as between poor and rich donors that for the social-action move- 
ments they are effectively meaningless as a help in soliciting individual 
gifts. 
The tax system as a whole is of  no assistance in enabling them to be 
self-supporting through the contributions of their own members. Rath- 
er, it condemns them to dependence on baronial benefactors. 
Others point out, however, that the differing rates of subsidy are merely 
an inevitable by-product of the progressive rate structure itself. If succes- 
sive amounts are taxed at higher and higher rates, then a reduction of a 
dollar of taxable income must produce a bigger tax reduction at higher in- 
comes.I3  Clearly this would not be the case with a tax credit, a fact that has 
led some critics of the deduction to favor a credit over the deduction on 
distributional grounds.  l4 
It is important to ask whether this differential subsidy effect has any rel- 
evance for distributional equity. In doing so, it is useful to distinguish two 
kinds of effects resulting from the deduction: effects on the tax liabilities 
of taxpayers and effects of changes in giving patterns. On the “tax side” 
the deduction affects taxpayers in much the same way a price reduction 
does: there is both an income and a substitution effect. The income effect 
is associated with the improvement in utility for a taxpayer who makes do- 
nations, as illustrated in figure 2.3. The substitution effect is the change in 
the relative price of giving. This substitution effect has no importance for 
distributional equity per se; it is important primarily for its efficiency im- 
plications. Its only distributional importance is in its effect on the pattern 
of support for charitable organizations, discussed below. 
12. See Boskin 1976 for a discussion of this point. 
13. See, for example, Wagner 1977, p. 2344. 
14. See, for example, Vickrey 1947, pp. 130-31, and Donee Group 1977, p. 72. 286  Behavior and Evaluation of Tax Policy 
By contrast, there are clear distributional consequences in the deduc- 
tion’s income effect. These are reflected in the effect of the deduction on 
tax liabilities. If the charitable deduction were eliminated the distribution 
of taxable income would change, and along with it the measured progres- 
sivity of the income tax. As between any two taxpayers the elimination of 
the deduction would raise average rate progre~sion’~  if 
where Y is income, rn is marginal tax rate, G is the level of contributions 
after elimination of the deduction, and the lower- and higher-income tax- 
payers are denoted by 1 and 2, respectively. In order to see the likely ef- 
fects on progressivity, table 8.1 shows how tax liabilities would change, 
based on the simulation model presented in chapter 3. Revenues are held 
constant in each simulation by  means of  proportional  changes in tax 
rates. The results show that it is quite likely that eliminating the deduction 
would in fact increase the progressivity of the income tax. Accounting for 
the anticipated fall in contributions, those simulations imply that tax lia- 
bilities for taxpayers with incomes under about $30,400  would decline due 
to the overall reduction in tax rates made possible by the expansion of the 
tax base. For taxpayers with incomes over $36,500,  taxes would rise. Con- 
version to a tax credit would increase tax progressivity even more. It is 
clear, therefore, that the existence and form of the incentive accorded to 
charitable contributions has effects on tax progressivity. While it would 
certainly be possible to neutralize the impact of any change in the charita- 
Table8.1  I  Ratio of Taxes under Two Proposals to Actual Taxes in 1983, 
by Income 
Elimination of  20 Percent 
Income (thousands)a  Deduction  Tax Credit 
$6.1 under 12.2  0.97  0.91 
$12.2under 18.3  0.98  0.96 
$18.3 under 24.3  0.98  0.97 
$24.3 under 30.4  0.99  0.99 
$30.4 under 36.5  1  .oo  0.99 
$36.5 under 60.9  1.01  1.02 
$60.9 under 121.7  1.01  1.03 
$121.7 under 243.4  1  .oo  1.03 
$243.4 under 608.5  1.01  1.03 
$608.5 under 1217  1.03  1.05 
$1217 or more  1.04  1.06 
All classes  1 .oo  1 .oo 
~~ 
Note:  Simulations use constant income and price elasticities. See chapter 3. 
aTaxpayers under $6,100 have no  tax liability under any of the simulated taxes. 
15. Using the average rate progression measure, a tax is progressive if the average tax rate 
rises with income. See Musgrave and Musgrave 1980, p. 376. 287  Behavior and Evaluation of Tax Policy 
ble deduction on tax progressivity by an appropriate restructuring in the 
tax schedule, it remains that the form of the incentive is a factor in deter- 
mining the progressivity of the tax. 
Tax incentives for giving may also have distributional consequences in 
their effect on giving patterns. Although the structure of net prices result- 
ing from a tax incentive has no direct distributional effect on donors, the 
pattern of  prices can affect the distribution of charitable support to var- 
ious groups of charitable organizations. Because the present deduction re- 
sults in net prices that fall with income, charities and charitable activities 
favored by the wealthy receive disproportionate encouragement. The re- 
sult, in Vickrey’s (1947, p. 131) words, is “a serious plutocratic bias to the 
activities of privately supported philanthropic, educational, and religious 
institutions.” 
To identify this bias is not to determine its ultimate distributional ef- 
fect, however. A complete assessment of  the distributional impact re- 
quires an examination of who ultimately benefits from the programs of 
charitable organizations. It is quite possible, as Schaefer (1968, p. 27) in 
fact suggests, that the charitable activities favored by  the wealthy are 
more redistributive than organizations supported by lower-income tax- 
payers.16  Unfortunately,  little research into the distribution of  benefits 
from charitable programs is available. Fragmentary evidence presented in 
chapter 2 on the distribution of  church expenditures suggests that a sig- 
nificant portion of expenditures by religious groups is used in support of 
congregational needs rather than redistribution,  but this may be a poor 
measure of the distribution of  actual benefits. It is quite conceivable that 
charities favored by the wealthy have no larger redistributive component. 
Finally, it is possible that the examination of the distributional impact 
of the charitable deduction should go beyond conventionally measured 
economic benefits to include the distribution of economic power. Some 
criticisms of the current deduction clearly imply that the present tax incen- 
tives for contributions have the effect of concentrating power at upper in- 
come levels.17  This possibility is most evident in the private foundation. 
Simon writes (1978, p. 5): 
We have to acknowledge the fact that private economic power is being 
deployed, often dynastically, through the device of the charitable foun- 
dation and the power it gives the founder and the founder’s family to 
select the objects of their charitable bounty and to manage the charita- 
ble assets. 
He concludes that, while the legal form and tax treatment of private foun- 
dations make it easier to achieve power, the “spectre of privilege” applies 
16. Boskin (1976, p. 50) also emphasizes the importance of identifying the beneficiaries of 
17. See, for example, Schaefer 1968, p. 25; Donee Group 1977; and Nielson 1979. 
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to some degree in all tax subsidies for giving available to wealthy taxpay- 
ers (Simon 1978, pp. 17,27). Still, one would expect that the distribution- 
al impact of a tax credit would be different from that of a deduction. 
8.3  Conclusion 
Federal tax policy has a substantial impact on the level and distribution 
of charitable giving in the United States. The empirical analysis discussed 
in this study suggests that support for charitable organizations responds 
both to explicit tax incentives for charitable contributions and to general 
changes in effective tax schedules. Certainly responses of this sort are im- 
portant for assessing the implications of actual or proposed tax provisions 
on the nonprofit sector. 
In the normative evaluation of tax policy from the viewpoint of society 
as a whole, such behavioral response is only one of a number of consider- 
ations. Efficiency and distributional equity are the two principal criteria 
for judging the desirability of tax incentives for charitable giving. The 
present deductions in the income and estate taxes have effects on the over- 
all progressivity of  those taxes, and the degree of behavioral response to 
tax incentives is relevant in measuring this effect. The differential pricing 
of contributions arising from the deduction is not itself an equity issue, 
but this price structure has distributional implications due to the particu- 
lar pattern of contributions that are encouraged and the benefits that are 
enjoyed as a result. Again, the degree of  behavioral response determines 
the importance of this distributional  effect. In judging the efficiency of 
tax incentives for contributions, the magnitude of the price elasticity of 
charitable contributions is only one of several important factors that need 
to be considered. Others include the external benefits derived from chari- 
table giving, the value of diversity in the provision of services, the effec- 
tiveness of such giving compared to government expenditures, and the 
distributional impact on donors and recipients. Except under very special 
assumptions, it is impossible to state any simple relationship between the 
price elasticity and the efficiency of tax incentives for charitable giving. 
The United States is distinctive among Western countries in its reliance 
on nonprofit institutions to perform major social functions. This reliance 
is rooted in American history and is fostered by federal tax provisions for 
charitable giving. This study had demonstrated that changes in tax poli- 
cy-effected  through legislation or inflation-can  have a significant im- 
pact on the level and composition of giving. As long as the nonprofit sec- 
tor retains its important role in the United States, understanding the effect 
of the tax structure on charitable giving will be an essential part of the 
study of public policy in education, health, and many areas of social wel- 
fare. Whether or not taxes are an explicit part of policy in any of these 
areas, taxes are certainly an important implicit component. 